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DUE PROCESS REQUIRES NOTICE
OF EXEMPTIONS AND A PROMPT
POSTSEIZURE HEARING FOR
POSTJUDGMENT GARNISHMENT
Finbergv. Sullivan'
On October 25, 1977, Sterling Consumer Discount Co. (Sterling)
obtained a default judgment against Beatrice Finberg, a sixty-eight-yearold widow living on Social Security retirement benefits. Sterling then
sought garnishment of her checking and savings accounts, which contained
$550 in Social Security benefits. In accordance with Pennsylvania law, the
bank sent Mrs. Finberg a copy of the writ of execution, which she received
on November 7. On November 18, she filed a petition in state court to set
aside the writ of execution on the grounds of two exemptions: the federal
Social Security benefits exemption 2 and a general $300 exemption under
Pennsylvania law.3 Five months later, the last of her money was ordered
released.
Before the state suit was resolved, Mrs. Finberg filed an action 4 in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.- She asserted that the Pennsylvania postjudgment garnishment procedures violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment because they did not provide her with adequate notice of the
garnishment and the opportunity for a prompt postseizure hearing on the
exemption issue. 6 The district court held that the Pennsylvania procedures
were constitutional. 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, over a vigorous dissent, vacated the district court's decision and
remanded, holding that the Pennsylvania procedures violated the due pro1. 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976). The exemption covers benefits deposited in
bank accounts. See Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2161 (Purdon 1967) (repealed 1978).
4. Sterling, Americo V. Cortese (the prothonotary who issued the writ of
execution), and Joseph A. Sullivan (the sheriff who served the writ) were named
as defendants. 634 F.2d at 52.

5. (1976) (amended 1979).
6. 634 F.2d~at 59. In the district court, Mrs. Finberg claimed in the alternative that due process required that the notice and hearing be provided prior to
the seizure. Finberg v. Sullivan, 461 F. Supp. 253, 256 (E.D. Pa. 1978), vacated,
634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980). Before the court of appeals, she conceded that

preseizure notice and hearing were not constitutionally required. 634 F.2d at 59.
See note 42 and accompanying text infra.
7. 461 F. Supp. at 263.
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cess clause because the procedures did not require notice to Mrs. Finberg of
her two exemptions and of the procedures for claiming them, and because a
prompt postseizure hearing was not available."
In reaching its conclusion, the court applied the standards of due process developed by the United States Supreme Court in the four leading cases
involving prejudgment seizure of property: 9 Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp. ,10 Fuentes v. Shevin,I Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,12 and North

Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.13 The Finberg notice require-

ment was unprecedented in the case law. 14 Moreover, the propriety of
applying the four prejudgment cases to a case of postjudgment seizure is far
from settled because of the conflicting rationale of EndicottJohnson Corp.
v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc.,15 the leading United States Supreme Court
case on postjudgment seizure.

The "Sniadachseries" of cases, i.e., Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and
8. 634 F.2d at 61-62. Other holdings of the court were that the prothonotary and the sheriff were proper defendants, that the case had not become
moot when Mrs. Finberg recovered all her money, and that the district court's
denial of class certification did not have a valid basis. Id. at 55-56, 64. Furthermore, the court held that the Pennsylvania procedures were invalid under the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution because they allowed a
"significant interruption of access to [Social Security] benefits." Id. at 63. The
court's supremacy clause analysis was much shorter and simpler than the due process analysis. It appears that the court was eager to deal with the unsettled due
process issue regarding postjudgment seizure of property because it could have invalidated the procedures solely on the simpler supremacy clause grounds. See,
e.g., Wood v.Georgia, 101 S. Ct. 1097, 1100 (1981) (decision of "novel" constitutional question avoided by remanding on another constitutional issue).
On March 26, 1981, the defendants filed two motions with the court of
appeals. The first motion requested vacation of judgment and entry of an order
directing the district court to dismiss the case as moot. The defendants argued
that amended postjudgment garnishment rules promulgated by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court on March 16, 1981, corrected the deficiencies in notice and hearing found by the court of appeals. The motion was denied. The second motion requested withdrawal of the notice of appeal to the United States Supreme Court;
this motion was granted. Finberg v. Sullivan, No. 79-1129, slip op. at 2-4 (3d Cir.
May 11, 1981).
9. 634 F.2d at 57-58.
10. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
11. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
12. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
13. 419 U.S. 601 (1975). The Sniadach series of cases was not a "radical
departure from established principles of procedural due process," but rather a
part of the "mainstream of past cases" that had established those principles. See
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 88.
14. 634 F.2d at 84 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
15. 266 U.S. 285 (1924).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/6
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North GeorgiaFinishing,may be summarized by stating that the specific
elements of due process required when property is seized depend on a
balancing of the competing interests. 16 The particular procedures in each
case must be evaluated in light of the interests of the parties. In Sniadach,
the Court held that the due process clause was violated when wages were
garnished before judgment without prior notice and opportunity for a
hearing.17 The same conclusion was reached in Fuentes with respect to
seizures under two replevin statutes. 18 In Mitchell, the Court appeared to
retreat from Fuentes by upholding a sequestration statute that did not provide preseizure notice and hearing but that did provide other procedural
safeguards. The safeguards present in Mitchell were the requirement that
the person seeking seizure of the property post a bond and submit an affidavit of specific facts justifying the seizure, the issuance of the writ by a
judge rather than a clerk, and the availability of an immediate postseizure
hearing for the person whose property was seized.' 9 The Mitchell Court did
not hold that due process required that particular combination of procedural safeguards, but rather that the "procedure as a whole" satisfied due
process; no minimum safeguards were specified. 20 North GeorgiaFinishing
demonstrated that Mitchellhad not overruled Fuentes.21 The Court held a
garnishment statute invalid because it did not provide for a preseizure hearing. and because other procedural safeguards, such as those available in
22
Mitchell, were not present.
In sharp contrast to the flexible standards of due process presented by
the four recent prejudgment cases stands EndicottJohnson. In that 1924
case, a judgment creditor sought to garnish the wages of the judgment
debtor. The debtor's employer asserted that the garnishment statute
violated the due process clause because it required no notice or hearing for
the judgment debtor prior to the garnishment. The Court held that prior
notice and hearing were not required because the debtor had already had
an opportunity to be heard in the proceedings leading up to the judgment
and thus was required to take notice of future proceedings the judgment
16. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 605-06;
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 604, 607, 618-19; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. at 82, 86-87; Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. at 340; Brown v.
Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d 1355, 1365 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
949 (1977); Betts v. Tom, 431 F. Supp. 1369, 1374 (D. Hawaii 1977); First Nat'l
Bank v. Hasty, 410 F. Supp. 482, 490 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Cf. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (requirements of due process in
administrative cases depend on balancing of private and governmental interests).
17. 395 U.S. at 341-42.
18. 407 U.S. at 96-97.
19. 416 U.S. at 604-07.
20. Id. at 610.
21. 419 U.S. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 606-07.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
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creditor might use to enforce the judgment. 23 The Court took a historical
approach in its analysis, emphasizing state practices. 24 There was no
balancing of the respective interests of the creditor and the debtor.
The Finberg court applied the balancing approach of the Sniadach
series, distinguishing EndicottJohnson on the ground that that Court was
not concerned with the possible garnishment of exfempt property. 2 This
purported distinction, however, cuts to the very heart of EndicottJohnson
because any execution may be improper for reasons such as the garnishment of exempt property. The proposition that a judgment debtor is entitled to no prior notice or hearing if the execution is proper begs the question to be decided by the hearing, i.e., whether the execution is proper.
Other federal courts have used the balancing approach in the postjudgment situation, with various analyses to avoid the application of Endicott

Johnson, some of which are as doubtful as the Finbergdistinction. 26 The

23. 266 U.S. at 288.
24. Id. at 288-90.
25. 634 F.2d at 56-57.
26. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946), is often cited in due process
analyses of the postjudgment situation. In 1936, Mrs. Griffin obtained an order
adjudging her ex-husband liable for alimony due under a 1926 decree. Mr. Griffin
participated in both the 1926 and 1936 proceedings. In 1938, Mrs. Griffin moved
to have a judgment docketed in her favor, as was necessary under New York law
for her to collect the alimony by execution. Judgment was entered ex parte for
both the amount due under the 1936 order and further amounts accruing up to
1938. Mrs. Griffin then sued Mr. Griffin to recover on the 1938 judgment. Under
New York law, Mr. Griffin could have set up various defenses in 1938 against the
motion to docket judgment, had he known of that proceeding, to reduce or
eliminate the amount of alimony attributable to the 1936-1938 period.
The United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause was
violated to the extent that the 1938 proceeding cut off those defenses because Mr.
Griffin was not notified of that proceeding; it "undertook substantially to affect
his rights in ways in which the 1926 decree did not." Id. at 229. Defenses that Mr.
Griffin otherwise could have raised in 1938 concerning the alimony adjudged due
in the 1936 proceeding were foreclosed by his notice of the 1936 proceeding, so
that the 1938 judgment did not cut off those defenses. Thus, the portion of the
1938 judgment concerning the alimony ordered in 1936 was affirmed because
"[d]ue process does not require that notice be given before confirmation of rights
theretofore established in a proceeding of which adequate notice was given." Id.
at 233-34.
The relationship between Griffin and Endicott Johnson turns on the
characterization of the garnishment in EndicottJohnson. If it is viewed as merely
a "confirmation" of the underlying judgment of liability, the two cases are consistent. If, however, the garnishment is viewed as substantially affecting rights not
adjudicated in the underlying trial, the two cases conflict. The latter of the two
characterizations is more accurate because garnishment is a proceeding by which
particular property of the debtor is taken to satisfy the judgment. The garnishment should always raise the issue of whether that particular property is subject to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/6
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appears to conflict with EndicottJohnson. The majority in Griffin, however, did
not mention EndicottJohnson. One dissenter did cite EndicottJohnson for the
proposition that notice was not necessary before execution. Id. at 240 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting in part). The United States Supreme Court has had opportunity to
consider the effect-of Griffin on EndicottJohnson, but has not done so. See note
27 infra.
The Finbergcourt did not discuss Griffin, but other courts have done so. See,
e.g., Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d 1355, 1364-65 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 949 (1977); Betts v. Tom, 431 F. Supp. 1369, 1373-74 (D.
Hawaii 1977). Both cases involved postjudgrnent garnishment. The court in
Brown recognized the possible conflict beween Griffin and EndicottJohnson, but
was unable to say that Griffin had overruled EndicottJohnson. After reconciling
the two cases by focusing on the confirmation language of Griffin as the equivalent of the Endicott Johnson rationale, the court concluded that its case
could not be decided on a confirmation rationale, citing and applying the balancing test used in the Sniadachseries. 539 F.2d at 1364-65. Cf. Strick Corp. v. Thai
Teak Prods. Co., 493 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (execution on property of
alleged alter ego of judgment debtor); Community Thrift Club v. Dearborn
Acceptance Corp., 487 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (execution of confessed
judgment). The court in Betts employed a similar analysis with respect to Griffin,
noting that the Court in Griffin did not mention EndicottJohnson. The Betts
court also mentioned the possibility of reading EndicottJohnson as concerning
only the standing of the garnishee to assert rights of the judgment debtor and the
possibility that EndicottJohnson applies only to the garnishment of property that
is not arguably exempt. 431 F. Supp. at 1372-74. These two distinctions are
unsound. The Court in EndicottJohnson did address the standing issue, 266 U.S.
at 288, but there is no language in the case limiting the due process holding to the
context of a garnishee's challenge. For a discussion of the artificiality of the
exemptions distinction, see p. 860 supra.
The court in First Nat'l Bank v. Hasty, 410 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Mich. 1976),
used the balancing of interests test and looked especially to Mitchell in deciding
whether the postjudgment garnishment procedures involved were constitutional.
Griffin was not mentioned, and EndicottJohnson was questioned on the basis of
the dissent in Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736, 736-42 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted). See note 27 infra. A
further reason advanced for following Mitchell rather than EndicottJohnson was
that the statute in Hasty more closely resembled the Mitchell statute than the EndicottJohnsonstatute. 410 F. Supp. at 487-88, 489 & n.8, 490-91. This reasoning
is unsound. What is provided by the statute determines whether the statute meets
a predetermined standard; the statute should not be allowed to control the selection of that standard. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring); id. at 177 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting). InArnett, sixJustices adhered to the
view that a statute creating an interest may not limit the due process required to
protect that interest.
For cases following Endicott Johnson without a discussion of Grffin, see
Halpern v. Austin, 385 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Katz v. Ke Nam Kim, 379
F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1974); Langford v. Tennessee, 356 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D.
Tenn. 1973) (per curiam). The courts in Halpern and Langford limited the application of the Sniadach series to the prejudgment situation.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
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best analysis of EndicottJohnson is not to attempt to distinguish it, but
rather to question its validity directly on the ground that the Court there
did not use the modem balancing approach of the Sniadachseries. 27 This
rationale was suggested by the Finbergcourt as a second reason for apply28
ing the balancing approach rather than EndicottJohnson.
Simply because the property deprivation occurs after judgment does
not eliminate the need for a balancing analysis. As pointed out by the
Finberg court, the judgment merely establishes the debtor's liability. It
does not give the creditor title to any of the debtor's property, and the ex27. See Greenfield, A Constitutional Limitation on the Enforcement of
Judgments-Due Process and Exemptions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 877, 884-87;
Comment, A Due Process Analysis of New York's Postjudgment Garnishment
Procedure,44 ALB. L. REV. 849, 853 (1980); Comment, Postjudgment Garnishment in Georgia:Acting Largely in the Dark, 12 GA. L. REV. 60, 73 (1977).
The United States Supreme Court has had occasion to reconsider Endicott
Johnson but has declined to do so. See Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606
(D.N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969); Knight v. DeMarcus, 102
Ariz. 105, 425 P.2d 837 (1967), cert. dismissed per curiam sub nom. Hanner v.
DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736 (1968). The district court in Moya followed Endicott
Johnson and upheld a statute that allowed the garnishment of wages without
notice or a hearing for the judgment debtor. Justices Harlan and Brennan would
have vacated and remanded in light of Sniadach, which had just been decided.
395 U.S. at 825. DeMarcusinvolved a statute that allowed the master in a divorce
proceeding to obtain a writ of execution against the party who failed to pay his fee
as ordered by the court, without notice to that party. In his dissent to the dismissal
of certiorari, Justice Douglas expressed his view that the Court should have decided whether to overrule EndicottJohnson, citing advances in the concept of due
process since EndicottJohnson. 390 U.S. at 740-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting). His
dissent was written before Sniadach had been decided. Justice Douglas also
discussed the conflict between EndicottJohnson and Griffin. See note 26 supra.
Justice Douglas' dissent has been cited as an indication of the demise of Endicott
Johnson. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Hasty, 410 F. Supp. 482, 489 n.8 (E.D.
Mich. 1976); Vail v. Quinlan, 387 F. Supp. 630, 635 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Scott
v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272, 1277 (N.D. I1l. 1972) (per curiam). On the other
hand, the dismissal of DeMarcus has been cited as an indication that Endicott
Johnsonis still good law. See, e.g., Katz v..Ke Nam Kim, 379 F. Supp. 65, 69 n.2
(D. Hawaii 1974); Langford v. Tennesee, 356 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 (W.D. Tenn.
1973) (per curiam).
For discussions of due process in the postjudgment situation, see generally
Alderman, DefaultJudgments and Postjudgment Remedies Meet the Constitution: Effectuating Sniadach and its Progeny, 65 GEo. L.J. 1 (1976); Dunham,
Post-judgment Seizures: Does Due Process Require Notice andHearing?, 21 S.D.
L. REv. 78 (1976); Greenfield, supra; Comment, A Due Process Analysis of New
York's Postjudgment Garnishment Procedure, supra; Comment, Notice and
JudicialSupervision in Postjudgment Garnishment-An Analysis of the Georgia
Provisions, 26 EMORY L.J. 597 (1977); Comment, Postjudgment Garnishment in
Georgia:Acting Largely in the Dark, supra.
28. 634 F.2d at 57-58.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/6
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ecution could still be defeated on grounds such as an exemption, which
may have been an issue not adjudicated in the underlying trial. Thus, the

a property interest sufficient to require the use of
judgment debtor still has
29

the balancing analysis.
Notice and an opportunity for a hearing are the basic elements of due

process.30 The controversy in a typical case will concern specifics, such as
31
the type of notice and hearing necessary and when they are to be given.

After balancing the competing interests of Sterling and Mrs. Finberg, the
court found that the Pennsylvania procedures did not afford Mrs. Finberg
adequate notice of the garnishment. Her interest in maintaining access to
funds needed to purchase basic necessities compelled a two-part notice:
notice of her two exemptions and notice of the procedures for claiming
32
them.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.33 established that
notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to...
afford . . . [interested parties] an opportunity to present their
objections. ' 3 4 The Finbergcourt derived the specifics of its notice requirement from Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft.3 5 The Memphis Light Court held that the failure of a municipal utility to notify its
customers of the procedures by which they could contest a proposed termination of services violated the due process clause. 36 That holding supports the Finberg requirement that the judgment debtor be informed of
the procedure to claim an exemption to garnishment.
The requirement that the judgment debtor also be informed of
specific exemptions, however, goes beyond the mere notice of procedures
required in Memphis Light. Even so, notice of the two exemptions required in Finbergdoes not appear to be unreasonably burdensome to the
creditor. The court did not specify the exact notice that should have been
given, but used language such as notice of the "existence" of the exemp29.

Id. The court's analysis is supported by Fuentes. The Fuentes Court

stated that the purpose of a hearing was "to minimize substantially unfair or
mistaken deprivations of property." 407 U.S. at 81. Such deprivations are possi-

ble after as well as before judgment. The Court made it clear that even temporary, nonfinal deprivations of property were subject to the mandates of the due

process clause and that whether the debtor ultimately would prevail on the merits
was irrelevant to his right to due process. Id. at 84-87.
30.

Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).

31. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 86.
32. 634 F.2d at 62. The timing of the notice was not in issue, as Mrs. Finberg
conceded that to protect Sterling's interest in preventing her from disposing of the
accounts, preseizure notice was not required. Id. at 59.
33. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 314.
436 U.S. 1 (1978).
Id. at 13-15.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
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tions.3 7 In light of the Mullane definition of notice, the court may have
contemplated something more than a mere reference to the relevant
statutory sections, but less than a requirement that the full text of the exemptions be reprinted. The notice apparently would be brief because the
court suggested that it be provided on the copy of the writ of execution forwarded to the judgment debtor by the garnishee.s
The notice of exemptions requirement, however, could prove
troublesome in the future. The court expressly confined its holding to the
two exemptions claimed by Mrs. Finberg. 39 As pointed out by the dissent,
it is hard to see where the line should be drawn in future cases involving
other exemptions; consequently, the eventual impact of Finbergmight be
to require notice of all state and federal exemptions. 40 The cost to the
creditor of providing this notice would have to be considered when balancing the interests. At some point, depending on the complexity of the exemptions involved, the burden on the creditor might compel a finding that
such a comprehensive notice is not required by due process. Requiring
notice of only the most important exemptions should satisfy the re4
quirements of due process. '
The Finbergcourt also found that the hearing afforded Mrs. Finberg
under Pennsylvania law was constitutionally infirm. Mrs. Finberg conceded that a preseizure hearing was not required by due process because
that would defeat Sterling's interest in preventing her from disposing of the
accounts. 42 Nevertheless, her interest in regaining the use of funds needed
to purchase basic necessities compelled the requirement of a prompt
postseizure hearing, as did Sterling's interest in minimal delay to facilitate
43
a quick, inexpensive collection of the debt.
Thus, Pennsylvania law was held to violate the due process clause in
both the notice and hearing provided for Mrs. Finberg. 44 According to the
37. 634 F.2d at 62.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 82 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
41. Cf. notes 63-64 and accompanying text infra (important Missouri exemptions).
42. 634 F.2d at 59.
43. Id. at 58-59. The court found that the Pennsylvania procedures did not
afford a prompt hearing because a decision on an exemption claim might not be
made for at least 15 days after the debtor filed his petition claiming an exemption. Id. at 59.
44. Mrs. Finberg had asserted that due process required additional,
Mitchell-type safeguards: the posting of a bond by the judgment creditor, the
submission by the judgment creditor of an affidavit stating that exempt funds
would not be attached, and the issuance of the writ of execution by a judge or
magistrate. The court did not discuss the merits of each assertion, but merely
held that due process did not require those safeguards. Id. at 62 (citing Brown v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/6
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dissent, the garnishment procedures of only one state would pass constitutional muster under Finberg.45 Indeed, it is doubtful whether the Missouri
postjudgrnent garnishment procedures would be found constitutional if
the Finbergrationale were to be applied to Mrs. Finberg's situation under
Missouri law.
Garnishment in Missouri is covered by Missouri Supreme Court Rule
90.46 The rule, in general, does not require notice of exemptions to judgment debtors. 47 Garnishment is, however, merely an aid to execution, 4
and the statutes governing executions and exemptions do impose a duty on
the officer levying the execution to inform the judgment debtor of his right
to claim certain exemptions. 49 This right to notice has been held applicable to the judgment debtor in a garnishment proceeding.5 0 The exemptions the officer must include in the notice are those for the head of a
family 5' and those for a person other than the head of a family. 52 There is,
however, no requirement that he include any federal exemptions,5 3 such as
the Social Security exemption, or notice of specific procedures by which to
Liberty Loan Corp., 539 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 949
(1977)). The garnishment statute in Brown was upheld even though there was no
such affidavit or judicial issuance required; a prompt postseizure hearing on the
exemption claim, however, was available. Because the due process required in
any given case depends on the balance of interests in that case, Brown should not
be used to uphold every statute that omits the additional safeguards. Similarly,
Mitchell should not be used to require the safeguards in every case. See note 20
and accompanying text supra.
45. 634 F.2d at 84 & n.28 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that
only OR. REV. STAT. § 23.665 (1979) would satisfy the majority in Finberg.
46. MO. SUP. CT. R. 90. This rule went into effect on January 1, 1981.
47. The rule does require the levying officer to give notice of exemptions to a
state employee whose wages are sequestered. Id. 90.22.
48. See id. 90.02.
49. See RSMO § 513.445 (1978). The duty also was found in Mo. Sup. Ct. R.
76.08 (1980), which was not included in Mo. SUP. CT. R. 76, which became effectiveJanuary 1, 1981.
Garnishment also may be in aid of attachment (prejudgment seizure). See
MO. SUP. CT. R. 90.02. Section 513.445 only covers execution; thus, the attachment debtor is not entitled to notice of exemptions. See State ex rel. Estes v.
Springer, 45 Mo. App. 252, 261 (K.C. 1891).
50. See Dancer v. Chenault, 527 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975).
51. RSMo §§ 513.435-.440 (1978).
52. Id. § 513.430.
53. The Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979) provides the maximum amount of wages that may be garnished. RSMO
§ 525.030 (1978) parallels the Act, and Mo. SUP. CT. R. 90.21 provides that the
writ of garnishment must include notice of those limitations. There is no requirement, however, that the judgment debtor receive a copy of the writ of garnishment; only the garnishee is served. Id. 90.20 does provide for personal service on
the debtor in an attachment (prejudgment seizure) proceeding.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
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claim an exemption. Thus, a court applying the Finberg rationale might
find these omissions violative of due process.
A Missouri court applying the Finberg rationale also might find fault
with the procedures by which the judgment debtor claims his exemptions.
It may be implied from the statute giving the levying officer the duty to set
aside exempt property5 4 that the judgment debtor may apply to the officer
to claim an exemption. It has been held that only the officer, and not the
magistrate court or the circuit court on appeal, has the jurisdiction to set
aside exempt property. 55 It is questionable, however, whether the officer's
decision would constitute a "hearing" for due process purposes.1 6 Furthermore, there are no time limitations placed on the officer's obligation to set
aside the property. As a result, his decision in any particular case may not
57
be prompt.
54. RSMo § 513.445 (1978).
55. See Dancer v. Chenault, 527 S.W.2d 714, 716-17 (Mo. App., K.C.
1975); Pacific Fin. Loans, Inc. v. Richardson, 412 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Mo. App.,
St. L. 1967). An exception to this rule was recognized in Dyche v. Dyche, 570
S.W.2d 293, 295 (Mo. En Banc 1978). The Dyche court held that, regardless of
the duties of the levying officer, the trial court has the responsibility to enforce
garnishment restrictions created by the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1673 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See generally note 53 supra.
MO. SUP. CT. R. 90.07 may change the Dancer rule. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 90.06

(1980) provided that the garnishee could discharge his liability by delivering the

property to the sheriff. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 90.07 provides for this delivery to be
made to the court, rather than to the sheriff. Under this scheme, it appears
logical to allow the judgment debtor to apply the court to claim an exemption,
and provision could be made in Rule 90 for a prompt hearing on the exemption
claim.
56. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 499 (1978).

57. If the officer refuses to set aside the exempt property, the judgment debtor may sue the officer on his bond. Dancer v. Chenault, 527 S.W.2d at 717.
The availability of other procedures for the judgment debtor to assert his exemptions is uncertain under Missouri law. One such possibility is the assertion of
the debtor's exemptions by the garnishee. Old Missouri cases have stated that exemptions are personal rights of the debtor and may not be asserted by the garnishee. See, e.g., Howland v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 134 Mo. 474, 480, 36
S.W. 29, 30 (1896); Osborne v. Schutt, 67 Mo. 712, 714 (1878). Howland was
cited for this proposition as late as 1944. See Pugh v. St. Louis Police Relief Ass'n,
237 Mo. App. 922, 938, 179 S.W.2d 927, 936 (St. L. 1944). Yet, in other cases,
exqmptions asserted by a garnishee have been allowed to the debtor. Ferneau v.
Armour & Co., 303 S.W.2d 161, 164, 167 (Mo. App., St. L. 1957); Tombs v.
Moore, 64 Mo. App. 667, 668 (St. L. 1896). Regardless of whether a garnishee
may assert the debtor's exemptions, there is no requirement that a garnishee
assert the debtor's exemptions; thus, this opportunity would not be available to
the debtor if the garnishee were uncooperative. The garnishee is required to
assert any jurisdictional defenses that the debtor might have. See First Nat'l Bank
v. Conner, 485 S.W.2d 667, 672 (Mo. App., St. L. 1972) (underlying judgment
void for lack of personal service on the debtor).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/6
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Finberg has provided more support for the proposition that a judgment debtor is entitled to a balancing of interests analysis in the determination of what process is due him in an execution proceeding. Courts
outside the Third Circuit should take the same balancing approach and
not apply Endicott Johnson. The Finberg requirement of a prompt
postseizure hearing is sound, as is the notice of exemptions and procedures
requirement, if not carried to extremes. 58 The Missouri Supreme Court
should consider amending its Rule 90 to provide for a prompt postseizure
hearing on the request of the judgment debtor, 59 as is already provided for
the garnishee under certain circumstances6 0 and for the debtor in
attachment 1 and replevin situations.6 2 Similarly, the Missouri legislature
should consider expanding the notice of exemptions requirement to inAnother procedure theoretically available for the judgment debtor is intervention under Mo. SUP. GT. R. 90.15, which is available to "[a]ny person
other than the garnishor who claims an interest in the property." In practice, this
route probably is not open to the judgment debtor. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 90.08 (1980)
stated that "[a]ny person claiming property... in the hands of a garnishee" could
interplead, but that broad language was interpreted as not including the judgment debtor. See Ahlgren v. Colvin-Weber Realty & Inv. Co., 507 S.W.2d 686,
687 (Mo. App., St. L. 1974). Similarly, MO. SUP. CT. R. 76.10, on executions,
provides that "[a]ny person, except the judgment debtor, claiming an interest in
property which has been levied upon may intervene .... ." Regardless of whether
the judgment debtor can intervene, RSMO § 507.090 (1978) and Mo. SUP. CT. R.
52.12, which cover intervention, contain no requirements that the determination
be prompt.
A third procedural possibility for the judgment debtor is to apply to the court
under id. 76.25 for a stay or order to quash the execution. Such a motion,
however, has been held to be properly granted only if the underlying judgment is
void for lack of jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Jones v. Reagan, 382 S.W.2d 426,
430 (Mo. App., St. L. 1964). Furthermore, consideration of such a motion is
premature if it cuts off the garnishor's right to serve interrogatories on the garnishee. See Squire's Shop, Inc. v. Boehlow, 482 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Mo. App., St.
L. 1972). Under Mo. SUP. CT. R. 90.13(a), the garnishor may wait as late as six
days after the return date of the writ to serve the interrogatories. The return date
of the writ may be as late as one year after the issuance of the writ, under id.
76.04. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 76.04 (1980) provided for a return date of between 30 and
90 days after the issuance of the writ. The current scheme does not afford the
judgment debtor a prompt hearing.
58. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
59. Similarly, an amendment to Mo. SUP. CT. R. 76 to provide a prompt
postexecution hearing for all judgment debtors would be appropriate.
60. Id. 90.12 (if court orders immediate delivery of property to sheriff under
id. 90.08, garnishee may request hearing, which must be held within 10 days after
request).
61. Id. 85.13 (hearing must be held within 10 days after request by owner of
property). Garnishment in aid of attachment is included in id. 85 as well as in id.
90. See id. 85.07, 90.02.
62. Id. 99.09 (hearing must be held within 10 days after request of defendant).
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